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Abstract
This paper analyses the importation of foreign steam technology into Cuba in the course of the nine-
teenth century, and the experience of the migrant workers employed to operate it, in order to focus
not on Cuba as an isolatable entity, but existing in the context of transnational networks that were
involving the island in processes of globalization. This was, at the outset, a ‘sub-imperial’ globaliza-
tion, operating independently, and implying liberation, from empire. The search for new technolo-
gies to enable improvements in sugar production necessarily took the Creole elite beyond the
restricted possibilities of the Spanish empire to the industrial centres of the United States, Britain,
and France. Such new links helped fuel the emergence of an independent Cuban identity; however,
the same globalizing tendencies that were eroding the Spanish empire led Cuba into new forms of
imperial domination. The increasing expense of the new steam technology necessitated a growing
dependence upon investment from foreign merchant banks, which gradually assumed control over
much of the island’s production and trade. The samemigrant engineers who had begun by assisting
Cuban planters took on the role of agents for foreign companies. Rather than contributing their
skills, as onemore group of migrants in a nation formed out of multiple migrations, these engineers
asserted their foreign identity and guarded their privileged position. They came to be seen as
symbolic of the process by which Cuba shook off the Spanish yoke only to replace it with another.
‘I write hurriedly and very late as I have just returned from a 2 days jaunt ... of a ride of 108
miles in the hot sun alternating with tropical rains’, wrote Charles Edmonstone from Cuba
in 1861. He continued:
Some of the agents here assert that neither storm or sun has an effect on me. I am so
wirey that I have offered to bet that I will kill any 5 horses that can be brought me
without rest to myself and one after another with fair fatigue. Today they find me
at Cienfuegos, next day at Villa Clara, next day at Sagua and two days after at San
Juan de los Remedios.1
Edmonstone was a migrant engineer, one of many such skilled workers who came to Cuba
in the course of the nineteenth century to install, run, and maintain the steam-powered
1 Museo de la Ciudad, Havana, Fondo Moreno Fraginals (henceforth MC, MF) 234/28/5.
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machinery that was being introduced into the Cuban sugar industry, helping to turn the
island into the world’s leading sugar producer.2 Although he was British-born, the activities
of Edmonstone – and others like him coming from the North Atlantic industrial centres –
reveal an independence from the narrow national concerns of the respective imperial powers
from which they came, happily filling orders ‘in the United States, England or wherever the
buyer wishes to give his preference’.3 Just like the diasporic merchants through whom much
capital investment and external trade occurred,4 these migrants demonstrate the globalizing
processes, developing beneath the bounds of conflicting imperial projects, that were eroding
Cuba’s identity as a Spanish colony. At the same time that they were contributing to
the island’s liberation, however, they were also helping to lay the foundations for new
manifestations of imperial control.
Despite the tendency for Cuban historiography to focus upon the developing national
project, this has generally been done within an implicitly transnational context, with
many historians seeing how the nation emerged not in isolation but in reaction to competing
imperial designs over the island.5 Others have focused on the economic aspects, in particular
the island’s dependency on sugar6 and the imperialism resulting from this.7 The strongest
analyses have looked beyond the national boundaries to take a regional approach,8 in which
the geopolitical rivalries of the Atlantic powers provides the context for understanding the
history not just of Cuba but of the Spanish Caribbean as a whole in the nineteenth century.9
In this paper I take such approaches further, through the case of the importation of steam
technology into Cuba in the course of the mid nineteenth century and the experience of
the migrant workers employed to operate it. Here the focus is not on Cuba as an isolatable
entity but within the context of transnational networks that were involving the island in
processes of globalization.10 However, rather than seeing these processes as the consequence
of imperial designs, I argue that this was, at the outset, a ‘sub-imperial’ globalization,
operating independently, and implying liberation, from empire.
2 Jonathan Curry-Machado, ‘Indispensable aliens: the influence of engineering migrants in mid-nineteenth-
century Cuba’, PhD thesis, London Metropolitan University, 2003.
3 MC, MF 234/27/1.
4 Roland T. Ely, Comerciantes cubanos del siglo XIX, Havana: Editorial Librerı´a Martı´, 1960; Philip
D. Curtin, Cross-cultural trade in world history, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
5 Herminio Portell Vila´, Historia de Cuba en sus relaciones con los Estados Unidos y Espan˜a, 4 vols.,
Havana: Jesu´s Montero, 1938–41; Jorge Ibarra, Nacio´n y cultura nacional, Havana: Editorial Letras
Cubanas, 1981; Manuel Moreno Fraginals, Cuba/Espan˜a: Espan˜a/Cuba, Barcelona: Crı´tica, 1995;
Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, Empire and antislavery: Spain, Cuba, and Puerto Rico, 1833–1874,
Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1999.
6 Ramiro Guerra y Sa´nchez, Azu´car y poblacio´n en las Antillas, Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales,
1970 [1927].
7 Oscar Zanetti and Alejandro Garcia, eds., United Fruit Company: un caso de dominio imperialista,
Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1976.
8 Jose´ Benı´tez, Las Antillas: colonizacio´n, azu´car e imperialismo, Havana: Casa de las Ame´ricas, 1977.
9 Luis Martı´nez-Ferna´ndez, Torn between empires: economy, society and patterns of political thought in
the Hispanic Caribbean, 1840–1878, Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1994.
10 Jonathan Curry-Machado, ‘Sin azu´car no hay paı´s: the transnational counterpoint of sugar and nation in
nineteenth-century Cuba’, Bulletin of Hispanic Studies, 84, 1, 2007, pp. 18–21.
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There are a number of uses of the term ‘sub-imperial’, elements of which can be seen in
this Cuban case. On the one hand, it can be a description of the way in which ‘white settler
states acquired more autonomy from the ‘‘mother country’’ and acted as partners in the
exercise of imperial power’.11 The term was first employed in this way in the early 1970s
by the Brazilian economist Ruy Mauro Marini, to describe the way in which Brazil aspired
to become a regional power, not merely succumbing to imperial dictates (in this case from
the United States) but ‘rather of collaborating actively with imperialist expansion, assuming
in this expansion the position of a key nation’.12 Among historians of the British Empire, the
term came to be employed in a variety of contexts, in particular with reference to South
African white settlers: ‘Such colonies articulated their own interests, which did not always
synchronize with metropolitan imperial policy and developed an ‘‘internal’’ colonial
relationship with indigenous peoples’.13 But these ‘indigenous peoples’ themselves have
sometimes come to act in a ‘sub-imperial’ manner, as in India, where the economically
and politically expansive interests of local elites continued to come into conflict with the
interests of the metropolitan British presence and control.14
In Cuba, the growth in sugar production from the end of the eighteenth century saw the
emergence of a Creole elite who sought the development of the island. They did so in what
could be described as a ‘sub-imperial’ way, as they strived to define themselves in a manner
that was distinct from that of the Spanish, developing the sugar industry in pursuit of their
own interests, and pushing the frontier of their cane-growing activities and control ever fur-
ther down the island. As with the white settlers in South Africa, this entailed a different,
more exploitative relationship, not with the ‘natives’ (who had been all but eradicated
from Cuba – or thoroughly absorbed – by the nineteenth century) but with the black slaves
upon whom they depended for labour.15 The search for new technologies to enable
improvements in sugar production necessarily took them beyond the restricted possibilities
of the Spanish empire to the industrial centres of the United States, Britain, and France.
11 Barbara Bush, Imperialism and postcolonialism, London: Pearson Eduction, 2006, p. 45.
12 Ruy Mauro Marini, ‘Brazilian ‘‘interdependence’’ and imperialist integration’, Monthly Review, 17, 7,
1965, p. 21. Marini appears to have first employed the term ‘sub-imperial’ to describe such processes in
‘Brazilian sub-imperialism’, Monthly Review, 23, 9, 1972, pp. 14–24. The term was more recently
resurrected as the Brazilian economy grew, along with its regional influence (Daniel Zirker, ‘Brazilian
foreign policy and subimperialism during the political transition of the 1980s: a review and reapplication
of Marini’s theory’, Latin American Perspectives, 21, 1, 1994, pp. 115–31; Matthew Flynn, ‘Between
subimperialism and globalization: a case study in the internationalization of Brazilian capital’, Latin
American Perspectives, 34, 6, 2007, pp. 9–27.
13 Bush, Imperialism and postcolonialism, p. 45. See also Robert Ross, Adam Kok’s Griquas: a study in the
development of stratification in South Africa, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976;
P. R. Warhurst, ‘Smuts and Africa: a study in sub-imperialism’, South African Historical Journal, 16,
1984, pp. 82–100; Timothy Keegan, ‘The making of the Orange Free State, 1846–1854: sub-imperialism,
primitive accumulation and state formation’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 17, 1,
1988, pp. 26–54; Hew Strachan, The First World War in Africa, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Patrick Bond has more recently shown how the term can also be applied to post-apartheid South Africa:
‘The ANC’s left turn and South African sub-imperialism’, Review of African Political Economy, 31, 102,
2004, pp. 599–616; idem, ‘Bankrupt Africa: imperialism, sub-imperialism and financial politics’,
Historical Materialism, 12, 4, 2004, pp. 145–72.
14 Robert J. Blyth, The empire of the Raj: India, eastern Africa and the Middle East, 1858–1947,
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
15 See, for example, Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, The conquest of history: Spanish colonialism and
national histories in the nineteenth century, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006.
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On the other hand, ‘sub-imperialism’ can also be taken to mean a different set of
processes, whereby migrants coming from metropolitan powers to colonial societies bene-
fited from their sojourn in these lands, not as imperial representatives (even if they often
held formal official positions) but rather in their own individual or collective interests,
‘even against the declared will of their governments in Europe’.16 In the Cuban case, we
can see how, in the mid nineteenth century, the sugar plantation owners were assisted in
their efforts to develop their industry both by the migrant engineers who accompanied the
new machinery and also by the often foreign-born merchants who enabled the island’s
involvement in the transnational commercial networks through which sugar was exported
and industrial goods imported. Such tendencies made Spanish dominion over Cuba increas-
ingly irrelevant and helped fuel both the emergence of an independent Cuban identity and
the explosion of the independence struggle after 1868.
However, the same globalizing tendencies that were eroding the Spanish empire were
causing Cuba to fall into new forms of imperial domination. Already in the mid nineteenth
century, the ‘sub-imperial’ migrants had come to act as the conduit through which Cuban
planters (along with the island’s industry and economy) became subjugated to new imperial
forces. The increasing expense of the new steam technology led to a growing dependence
upon investment from metropolitan merchant banks, which gradually assumed control
over much of the island’s production and trade. Despite some efforts to develop indigenous
industry, Cuba remained dependent upon imported technology. The same migrant engineers
who had begun by assisting Cuban planters took on the role of agents for North American
and European engineering companies. Rather than contributing their skills, as one more
group of migrants in a nation formed out of multiple migrations, engineers such as Charles
Edmonstone tended to assert a ‘foreign’ identity17 and guarded their privileged position;
alongside the advantages of which they became singled out negatively, pointed to as
convenient scapegoats, and seen as symbolic of the process by which Cuba shook off the
Spanish yoke only to replace it with another.18 Just as the phoenix emerges reborn from
the flames that consumed it, so too did empire in Cuba from that which at one time
appeared to be hastening its demise.
Sugar and technological advances
Although sugar production first began in Cuba in the sixteenth century, it remained a small-
scale business until the final years of the eighteenth century, when Cuba found itself parti-
cularly well placed to benefit from the vacuum in the world sugar market resulting from
revolution in neighbouring Saint Domingue.19 This occurred at a time of growing world
16 Trutz von Trotha, ‘Colonialism’, in Stefan Berger, ed., A companion to nineteenth-century Europe,
1789–1914, Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, p. 439.
17 Curry-Machado, ‘Indispensable aliens’, pp. 209–13.
18 Jonathan Curry-Machado, ‘Privileged scapegoats: the manipulation of migrant engineering workers in
mid-nineteenth century Cuba’, Caribbean Studies, 35, 1, 2007, pp. 207–45.
19 Benı´tez, Las Antillas, pp. 136–8; Julio Le Riverend, Historia econo´mica de Cuba, Havana: Editorial de
Ciencias Sociales, 1967, p. 161; Sherry Johnson, Social transformation of eighteenth-century Cuba,
Gainsville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2001.
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demand for sugar, as it became an increasingly important element of proletarian diets in
Europe and North America.20 Thus, sugar prices rose rapidly, making an expansion in
cane fields particularly attractive for Cuban planters who had previously devoted most of
their land to coffee.21 The rise in Cuban sugar production was later assisted by the crisis
in the British West Indies following slave emancipation,22 at a time when, despite the
outlawing of the slave trade, the use of chattel labour in Cuba intensified.23
As a result, by the mid nineteenth century Cuba had become the world’s leading sugar
producer, accounting for more than 40% of all cane sugar,24 with the island’s importance
seen not only in quantity of production but also in the quality of the sugar, it ‘being of a
dry, firm grain [and] therefore always sold readily and at good prices’.25 This period saw
the establishment of large numbers of new plantations and sugar mills, with the sugar
frontier moving inexorably down the island.26 The scale of production likewise increased,
with the average output per mill growing from just 72 tons a year in 1830 to 316 tons by
1860,27 with the largest producing as much as 3,000 tons in a single harvest.28 Sugar
came to dominate not only land use but also Cuba’s trade. Between 1827 and 1846, sugar
and its derivatives made up almost two-thirds of the island’s exports, bringing with it con-
siderable wealth to those in a position to benefit.29 Although excluded from political power
by the Spanish, prominent Cuban families, with fortunes accumulated from expanding
sugar plantations, dominated not just rural society30 but national life in general. This new
economic elite was instrumental in the emergence of liberal, modernizing bodies, in particu-
lar the Real Consulado and the Sociedad Econo´mica de Amigos del Paı´s, through which
Enlightenment influences and scientific advances from Europe and North America found
their way into Cuba.
20 Sidney W. Mintz, Sweetness and power: the place of sugar in modern history, New York: Penguin, 1985,
pp. 74–150.
21 Louis A. Pe´rez Jr, Cuba: between reform and revolution, 2nd edn, New York: Oxford University Press,
1995, pp. 71–4.
22 Michelle Harrison, King Sugar: Jamaica, the Caribbean and the world Sugar economy, London: Latin
America Bureau, 2001, p. 107; William A. Green, British slave emancipation: the sugar colonies and the
great experiment, 1830–1865, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976.
23 Ramiro Guerra y Sa´nchez et al., Historia de la nacio´n cubana, Havana: Editorial Historia de la Nacio´n
Cubana, 1952, p. 78; Franklin W. Knight, Slave society in Cuba during the nineteenth century, Madison,
WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970, p. 24.
24 Manuel Moreno Fraginals, El ingenio: complejo econo´mico social cubano del azucar, vol. 3, Havana:
Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1978, pp. 35–7; Alan Dye, Cuban sugar in the age of mass production:
technology and the economics of the sugar central, 1899–1929, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
1998, p. 27.
25 Richard McCulloh, Reports of the Secretary of the Treasury of scientific investigations in relation to
sugar and hydrometers, Washington, DC: Wendell and Van Benthuysen, 1848.
26 Levi Marrero, Cuba: economı´a y sociedad, Madrid: Editorial Playor, 1973–86, vol. 10, p. 278; Moreno
Fraginals, El ingenio.
27 Pe´rez, Cuba, p. 75.
28 Benı´tez, Las Antillas, p. 200.
29 Marrero, Cuba, vol. 12, p. 115.
30 Laird W. Bergad, Cuban rural society in the nineteenth century: the social and economic history of
monoculture in Matanzas, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990.
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They also went out of their way to facilitate the introduction of the latest advances in
steam technology and sugar-milling machinery, originally developed in eighteenth-century
Britain for cotton manufacture but subsequently adapted to the demands of other industries
and gradually extended to other countries, in large part through the migration of engi-
neers.31 These enabled an intensification in production and processing, along with a consid-
erable improvement in the global transport of commodities.32 Sugar, for all that it was an
agricultural product, was – because of its need for some form of industrial processing to
be turned into a usable, and marketable, product – particularly suited to the application
of such technological advances. The high profitability of sugar production in the nineteenth
century also provided this industry with the wherewithal to sponsor further improve-
ments.33 In Cuba, the earliest use of a steam engine connected to a sugar mill was not until
the 1790s.34 Joaquı´n de Santa Cruz purchased an engine from London for his ‘Ceibabo’
estate in 179635 and, although this does not seem to have met with much success, interest
in exploring the application of steam technology on Cuban sugar estates did not wane.36
By 1819, Pedro Diago was able to process an entire year’s harvest using a steam-driven
mill,37 and his example encouraged other leading planters, many of whom had likewise
installed steam engines by the 1830s.38
It quickly became evident how irrelevant Spain had become to the island’s development.
For example, in 1851 attempts were made by the authorities to facilitate the purchase of a
first-class steam engine from Spain, out of a desire to stimulate Spanish rather than foreign
industry,39 news having reached them that engines were built there just as well and solidly
as in other countries. However, when enquiries were made, the best they could come up
with was a factory that boasted to be able to build any sugar mill, so long as they were given
the details of the steam engine to be used – the implication being that they would be unable
to supply this themselves.40 The reality was that steam engines, and almost all other sugar
machinery, had to be obtained from the industrial centres of Great Britain, the United
States, and France. New York, Glasgow, Liverpool, and Le Havre – the port cities that
31 David J. Jeremy, Transatlantic industrial revolution: the diffusion of textile technologies between Britain
and America, 1790–1830s, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981.
32 See, for example, Richard L. Hills, Power from steam: a history of the stationary steam engine,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993; and Joel Mokyr, Lever of riches: technological creativity
and economic progress, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
33 On the general development of the sugar industry, see Noel Deerr, The history of sugar, 2 vols, London:
Chapman & Hall, 1949–50; and J. H. Galloway, The sugar cane industry: an historical geography from
its origins to 1914, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
34 ‘Proyecto sobre mejorar la ma´quina de exprimir can˜a’, Biblioteca Nacional ‘Jose´ Martı´’, Havana
(henceforth BNJM), C.M. Sociedad Econo´mica 15/21.
35 BNJM, C.M. Pe´rez Beato, legajo 12; Marrero, Cuba, vol. 10, pp.158–9.
36 Moreno Fraginals, El ingenio, vol. 1, p. 87.
37 Portell Vila´, Historia de Cuba, vol. 1, p. 199.
38 Jacobo de la Pezuela y Lobo, Diccionario geogra´fico, estadı´stico, histo´rico de la isla de Cuba, vol. 1,
Madrid: Imprenta del Establecimiento de Mellado, 1863, p. 58.
39 Anales de las Reales Junta de Fomento y Sociedad Econo´mica de la Habana, 4, 1851, p. 247.
40 Archivo Nacional de Cuba, Havana (henceforth ANC), Fondo Gobierno Superior Civil (henceforth GSC)
372/14200.
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together formed the nexus for nineteenth-century Atlantic commerce – were also the prin-
cipal centres for the engineering industry and the source of most of the steam engines and
other machinery imported into Cuba.41
The first steam-powered mills to be introduced in Cuba came from such British engineer-
ing companies as Fawcett Preston of Liverpool;42 even in the mid nineteenth century,
despite growing competition from other countries, it could be boasted that ‘we must still
believe that English engineers are to carry out the majority of the great works of improve-
ments in all countries where engineering talent is not indigenous’.43 As late as the 1870s,
over 90% of cane-crushing mills bought in Puerto Rico came from Britain, with just 15
of a total of 294 bought in the United States.44 However, by the 1830s and 1840s, US engin-
eering firms were making innovations in technology, taking it in different directions to that
of the British, in particular through the development of higher pressure engines.45 New
York engineering firms such as the Novelty Iron Works and the Matteawan Works became
important producers of stationary steam engines of the kind that might be applied to sugar
mills,46 and from the late 1830s the West Point Foundry established its reputation among
those planters more inclined to look to the north than to Europe.47 As a result, for all
that British engineering continued to be influential in Cuba, by the 1840s the United States
was becoming established as the principal provider of sugar machinery.48
Luis Martı´nez-Ferna´ndez argues that development in Cuba during this period was
broadly defined by the pressures and influences exerted by the rival imperial powers that
were vying for regional hegemony.49 However, although the machinery that was acquired
in the development of the Cuban sugar industry came from the factories of these competing
powers, the initial impulse for its introduction in Cuba came not from attempts by these
powers to challenge Spanish control over the island but from the Cuban planters themselves
seeking to satisfy Cuba’s developmental needs by accessing the latest technological
advances. Prominent landowners became students of milling and refining technology,
eagerly learning from all such developments and exploring how to apply them to their
own industry – not in a slavish attempt to mimic the ideas and practices of Europeans
41 Paul Butel, The Atlantic, London & New York: Routledge, 1999, pp. 223–33.
42 A. A. Ramos Mattei, ‘The role of Scottish sugar machinery manufacturers in the Puerto Rican plantation
system, 1842–1909’, Scottish Industrial History, 8, 1, 1985, p. 21; Moreno Fraginals, El ingenio, vol. 1,
pp. 207–8.
43 The Engineer, 12 November 1858, p. 376.
44 Ramos Mattei, ‘The role of Scottish sugar machinery’, p. 20.
45 David J. Jeremy, ‘Innovation in American textile technology during the early 19th century’, Technology
and Culture, 14, 1, 1973, pp. 40–76; David J. Jeremy and Darwin H. Stapleton, ‘Transfers between
culturally-related nations: the movement of textile and railroad technologies between Britain and the
United States, 1780–1840’, in David J. Jeremy, ed., International technology transfer: Europe, Japan and
the USA, 1700–1914, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1991, pp. 31–48.
46 Carroll W. Pursell, Early stationary steam-engines in America: a study in the migration of a technology,
Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1969; Louis C. Hunter, A history of industrial power in
the United States, 1780–1930, Vol. 2: steam power, Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia,
1985.
47 Ramos Mattei, ‘The role of Scottish sugar machinery’, p. 21.
48 Martı´nez-Ferna´ndez, Torn between empires, p. 84.
49 Ibid.
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and North Americans, but because they recognized in this both the potential to further their
own individual interests and also the possibility of collectively pulling the island out of the
feudal and protectionist past of Spanish dominion into the modern age of industrial produc-
tion and globalizing trade. For example, in 1849, Joaquı´n de Ayestera´n became the first
planter to install centrifuges in a Cuban mill,50 just five years after the first ever demonstra-
tion of the use of a centrifuge for separating sugar crystals, in Germany.51 In 1850, he trav-
elled to Europe, visiting Liverpool, Birmingham, and Paris, and returned to Cuba with the
materials and machines that he needed to modernize his ‘Amistad’ estate.52
During the mid nineteenth century, the use of steam in Cuba’s sugar mills became
generalized, with 70% using steam engines by 1860, up from just 20% in 1846.53 Advances
were introduced in all aspects of sugar production, so enabling the improvements in quality
for which Cuban sugar became renowned.54 Accelerated sugar production also required
improved transport, and this led to the development (again using mainly British and North
American technology) of an extensive rail network – the sixth in the world to be constructed,
several years before that in Spain itself – and steam-boat routes.55 Although leading to the
importation of large quantities of machinery, far from originating in a process of imperial pen-
etration of the Cuban market by foreign producers, the initial impulse for this came from Cuba
itself, through personally established networks. Not only did this enable the development of
Cuba’s sugar production and infrastructure through inclusion in the globalizing distribution
of new technologies but it also enabled the engineering companies themselves to further extend
the reach of their products, far beyond the bounds of their respective national empires. In the
initial years, this occurred not through the unequal exchanges characteristic of economic
imperialism but through the equal interchange between Cuban planters and foreign machine
manufacturers, in a process that sidelined Spanish imperial control over the island.
Migrant engineers and transnational development
This new machinery required specialized labour for its installation, operation, and mainten-
ance, and Cuba lacked workers with the necessary skills.56 As a result, ‘with steam engines
came mechanics, who were mostly foreigners’:57 ‘every mill, every steam boat, every train
50 Manuel Moreno Fraginals, The sugarmill: the socio-economic complex of sugar in Cuba, 1760–1860,
New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976, p. 117.
51 Geoffrey Fairrie, Sugar, Liverpool: Fairrie & Co., 1925, p. 168.
52 BNJM, Lobo 108, vol. 3, file 2.
53 Martı´nez-Ferna´ndez, Torn between empires, p. 98; Bergad, Cuban rural society, p. 90; Marrero, Cuba,
vol. 10, p. 159.
54 Moreno Fraginals, El ingenio; Dye, Cuban sugar; Curry-Machado, ‘Indispensable aliens’.
55 Oscar Zanetti and Alejandro Garcı´a, Caminos para el azu´car, Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales,
1987.
56 Bergad, Cuban rural society, pp. 121–2.
57 Fe´ Iglesias Garcı´a, ‘The development of capitalism in Cuban sugar production, 1860–1900’, in Manuel
Moreno Fraginals, Frank Moya Pons, and Stanley L. Engerman, eds., Between slavery and free labor: the
Spanish-speaking Caribbean in the nineteenth century, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1985, p. 58.
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locomotive has to have with it an intelligent foreigner to direct and inspect the engine’.58
Such skilled workers were generally looked for in the same countries that produced the
machinery. Often orders included a condition that appropriate technicians be sent at the
same time ‘to put together that machinery and remain in charge of it’.59 For example,
when two steam boats to be used in Matanzas Bay were bought in New York from the Nov-
elty Iron Works, it was stipulated that the factory should provide two trustworthy engineers
skilled in their operation.60 Likewise, when locomotives were acquired from Philadelphia
for the Ca´rdenas to Bemba railway in 1839, it was requested that they should come with
‘a man who knows how to direct them’.61
Even when there were engineering workers available locally, there was often a prefer-
ence shown by planters to engage those recommended by the manufacturers, who had pro-
ven experience with the specific machines that they were installing. They would also be
recruited on behalf of planters and other employers through agents placed in countries
such as Britain and the United States. In 1838, the chief engineer of the Havana–Gu¨ines
line ordered four locomotives from Britain. He requested that Alexander Robertson, who
was acting as both the chief investor and British agent of the rail company, also find, along
‘with duplicates of machinery’, four engineers ‘and as many machinists or men who under-
stand the repair and construction of Locomotives’.62
The number of engineering workers in these countries increased greatly during the
nineteenth century;63 and, although such workers were among the better paid, lived in
less cramped conditions, and had least recourse to the workhouse, for many, poverty and
job insecurity continued to be a threatening presence.64 With the exportation of machinery
around the world came an extension of the well-established tramping tendencies of engin-
eering workers.65 While there were those who travelled to Cuba intentionally, often
with pre-arranged jobs, others arrived almost by accident, as they pursued journeys from
one job and place to another. For example, William Bisby had passed through a wide
selection of jobs in the United States, before accepting a position on a steam ship. This
opened up to him the possibility of travelling overseas in search of work, prompted by
the unstable prospects that he had experienced back home, eventually leading him into
employment in Cuba.66
58 Francisco de Paula Serrano, in Memorias de la Sociedad Econo´mica de la Habana, 11, 1840, p. 240.
59 British Parliamentary Papers 1841, I, vii, pp. 88–9.
60 Archivo Histo´rico Nacional, Madrid (henceforth AHN), Ultramar, Cuba/Fomento (henceforth UCF)
35/2, no. 35.
61 Diario de la Habana, 24 November 1839.
62 ANC, Real Consulado y Junta de Fomento (henceforth RCJF) 131/6412.
63 Eric Hobsbawm, Industry and empire, London: Penguin, 1969, p. 117.
64 Geoffrey Crossick, An artisan elite in Victorian society: Kentish London, 1840–1880, London: Croom
Helm, 1978, pp. 110–3; John Belchem, Industrialization and working class: the English experience,
1750–1900, Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1990, p. 156.
65 Eric Hobsbawm, Labouring Men: Studies in the History of Labour, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson,
1986.
66 ANC, Comisio´n Militar (henceforth CM) 51/1, pp. 416–29.
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A lively internal labour market for engineering workers quickly developed in Cuba, as
burgeoning sales of steam engines and steam machinery brought a rapid increase in their
demand – ranging from the more highly skilled, capable of constructing the machinery
and even contributing to its further development, through those who operated and main-
tained it, to those with less specialized skills, employed in urban workshops and foundries.
Those already established in the island provided a route in for others eager to work there,
often seeking out opportunities for them. It was in this way that William Whitehorn left
Britain ‘in order to fit up machinery in Cuba’, contracted by the veteran engineer Edward
Beanes.67 Joel Watts travelled to Cuba having been assured by Henry Elkins, who was
already established on a sugar estate, that he would have secure employment there. On
his arrival, this job proved not to exist, but he nevertheless found work in the foundry in
Havana. Between 1843 and 1852, 622 migrant engineers are recorded as having settled in
the island68 – or 22% of all migrants so applying –and their numbers were likely to have
been increased to a certain extent by those who only travelled to the island seasonally.69
With at least 943 sugar mills using steam by 1860,70 along with the spreading rail network,
mines, and urban foundries and workshops, although there were a growing number of
Cuban and Spanish engineers employed, it is probable that the number of migrant engineers
continued to expand.
By the 1860s, this job market was well established, with migrant engineering workers
often passing from one job to another by word-of-mouth recommendations,71 by placing
adverts in the local press, or by directly approaching potential employers. As more and
more gained experience of Cuba, their presence made the necessity for the engine manufac-
turers to provide artisans less pressing. As early as 1838, the planter Pedro Diago told
William Kemble of the West Point Foundry that he would not need him to send out anybody
with his new machinery, since he was already in agreement with the man who had mounted
the machinery of a neighbouring mill, ‘and this one has the advantage for me that he speaks
Spanish, and has experience of this country’.72 Although Baring Brothers intended to send a
favourite engineer of theirs to oversee the installation of the new steam engine and mill on
the ‘Arroyo’ estate,73 he himself declined the position, recommending that they should sim-
ply employ the engineer already working there, ‘saying he knew he was as competent as any
man we could find’. Besides, he had no need to accept, since he had more than sufficient
engagements to keep him occupied.74
Far from all being members of a clearly defined trade, mid nineteenth century migrant
engineers came from an industrial milieu that brought together ‘Engineers, Machinists,
67 National Archives, London (henceforth NA), FO 72/830, no. 6; NA, FO 72/830, no. 24.
68 ANC, Miscele´nea de Libros (henceforth ML) 11080 and 11910; also AHN, UCF 30/2, no. 2.
69 Curry-Machado, ‘Indispensable aliens’.
70 Carlos Rebello, Estados relativos a la produccio´n azucarera de la Isla de Cuba, Havana: publisher
unknown, 1860.
71 BNJM, Sociedad T.34, no. 1a.
72 BNJM, Lobo 111, vol. 3.
73 Barings Archive, London (henceforth BA), LB 22, no. 231.
74 BA, HC 4.6.10, no. 65.
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Millwrights, Smiths, and Pattern Makers’, the boundaries between which were far from
clear.75 Unfortunately, Cuban and Spanish records from the mid nineteenth century tended
to use fairly indiscriminately and interchangeably the terms maquinista (machinist), ingeniero
(engineer), andmeca´nico (mechanic) to describe foreign artisans who may have ranged greatly
in the level of skill that they possessed. Nevertheless, it is probable that the majority of those
who worked in the sugar mills necessarily demonstrated sufficient skill not only to be left in
sole charge of expensive machinery and ensure its smooth operation but also to maintain it
and have the wherewithal to carry out, or otherwise guarantee, the necessary repairs.
So long as the machinery was running smoothly, the job of a sugar-mill engineer was a
relatively relaxed one. Even during the grinding season, when they supposedly had little free
time because their full attention was required – and even more so during the other six
months of the year when there was relatively little work to be done at the mill, beyond rou-
tine maintenance – such workers had much opportunity to turn their attention to more than
merely keeping existing engines in operation. Manuel Moreno Fraginals – who, from the
1960s, set the scene for the study of the Cuban sugar industry – asserted that ‘the slave
had no contact with the engine’.76 However, even when there was only one engineer
employed by a sugar estate, he would not be expected to do all the machine-related work.
For all that most slaves were employed in the unskilled manual labour of the fields and
mills, there was nevertheless an important elite of slaves trained and skilled in artisan trades.
For example, on the ‘Palma’ estate, of the seventy-five adult male slaves, eleven had trades
and two of these were engaged in engineering duties.77 Such slaves were considered to have
a market value considerably higher than that of others. In 1844, when troops killed seven
slaves and arrested three others on Theodore Phinney’s estate, accusing them of involvement
in a conspiracy for an uprising, one of these was listed as an engineer/blacksmith, worth
$5000 – twenty times the average price for a male slave.78 On the ‘Flor de Cuba’ estate,
the slave Juan was known by all as ‘el maquinista’ and had a close working relationship
with the foreign engineer.79 Just as the migrant engineers were privileged among free work-
ers, so too were the slave engineers among their fellow slaves, with the foreign engineers
often showing them a level of trust that was highly unusual on slave plantations. For
example, whenever Henry Elkins left the estate on which he worked, he always felt confid-
ent in leaving the engine in charge of the slave Juan Lucumı´;80 and there were many cases in
which the engineers would encourage the slaves appointed to work under them to learn the
trade well, so that one day they would be able to practise it in their own right.81
75 Modern Records Centre, Warwick, MSS 259/2/1/1, Amalgamated Society of Engineers, Quarterly
reports, September 1853, and Annual branch reports, 1853.
76 Fraginals, El ingenio, vol. 1, p. 213.
77 Bodleian Library, Oxford, Henry E. Emerson Papers (henceforth BL, HEE), MSS Span c. 3, ‘La Palma’
Estate Book 3.
78 NA, FO 72/664, no. 19, letter from Theodore Phinney to British Consul, Joseph Crawford, Havana,
29 June 1844; Bergad, Cuban rural society, p. 203.
79 ANC, CM 63/9.
80 ANC, CM 51/1, pp. 260–2.
81 Ibid., pp. 84–5.
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This situation meant that many of the migrant engineers on the sugar estates were
able to accrue not just their own capital, thanks to their high income, but also time
to engage in other activities. The experience that they acquired in Cuba provided them
with the knowledge and skills necessary to make contributions themselves to further
technological development. For example, Ezra Dod invented, while working on Cuban
sugar estates, a ‘tubular juice heater’, which ‘worked with the exhaust steam of the mill
engine as the estate had no multiple effect’; an ‘upright tube vacuum pan’; and a new
housing for the mill, successfully demonstrating the advantages to be gained by placing
the cane carrier in such a way as to ensure that the cane entered at right angles to the
mill rollers.82
Seasonal employment also enabled engineers to divide their time between work in
Cuba and leisure in the United States or Europe. It was very common for planters to
take advantage of such trips to use them as agents charged with placing orders with
factories for new machinery and parts.83 Although most planters had commercial agents
representing them, it was felt that these skilled workers were most effective in such a role,
since they could give very precise specifications to the manufacturers.84 Thus, when
Henry Elkins travelled back to Britain in 1843 to spend the summer, he placed orders
directly with the leading Liverpool firm of sugar-machine manufacturers, Fawcett Preston.85
In June 1840, Frederick Shuck, who worked on Francisco Diago’s ‘Caunabaco’ estate,
left for the United States carrying a letter of introduction from his employer to the latter’s
commercial representative in New York, requesting him to place an order at the West Point
Foundry according to the specifications given by Shuck, who was to return to Cuba in
September.86
The initial stimulation for Cuba’s involvement in the technology-driven globalization
that was underway in the nineteenth century might have come from the desire of Cuban
planters to develop sugar production, thus increasing their own fortunes. However, the
migrant engineering workers that this required quickly became the agents through whom
such networks became strengthened and extended, motivated primarily by considerations
of technological and commercial advantage, rather than furthering economic imperialist
interests. They assisted Cuba’s entrepreneurs in their break from Spanish monopoly to the
free selection of where best to take their business, apparently liberated from commitment
to any particular national or imperial interests.
Transnational merchants and commercial networks
An important role was played in both importing machinery and contracting the necessary
skilled workers by merchant houses based in the island, generally foreign-born merchants
who did much to improve Cuba’s place within the international commercial networks.
82 Louisiana Planter and Sugar Manufacturer, 7 February 1914 and 11 September 1915.
83 BNJM, Lobo 111/1.
84 Glasgow University Archives and Business Records Centre, UGD 118/1/2/3.
85 ANC, CM 51/1.
86 BNJM, Lobo 109/3.
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While the majority of merchants operating in Cuba were from Spain,87 there was an
important core of non-Spanish traders who dominated much of the island’s import and
export business (although Spanish law required them to operate in formal partnership at
least with a Spanish merchant) and were highly influential in the development of the island’s
connections with Europe and North America.88 These non-Spanish merchants do not
appear to have been particularly committed to the national/imperial interests of the coun-
tries from which they came. Although founded by James Drake, who emigrated from Britain
to Cuba in the 1790s, Drake Brothers & Co. traded more heavily with Spain, France,
Russia, and Germany than with Britain;89 among its partners it came to include, alongside
Drake’s sons, a Spaniard, a North American, and a Swiss.90
In the nineteenth century, the Spanish who dominated Cuban commerce appear to have
lacked the spirit of speculation necessary for pushing the island into the transnational com-
mercial networks through which trade was becoming globalized.91 The non-Spanish mer-
chants, on the other hand, were able to take advantage of their relationships with
European and North American merchants and manufacturers to ‘execute orders more
advantageously’92 or to otherwise use their superior knowledge of modern commercial
methods.93 Hence, although Adot, Spalding & Co. had ‘no property outside of their busi-
ness capital which is supposed not to be large’, they were much sought after, and had a
very good credit rating both in Cuba and the United States, where they had ‘many good
friends’.94 Thus it was through such merchants that the transnational commercial networks
reached into Cuba; and partnerships were frequently formed that included one merchant in
Cuba and the other in another country. For example, the dry goods business of Tennant &
Clark was made up of Tennant in Havana and Clark in England;95 and the Matanzas-based
merchant Florentio Huertas teamed up with James Baring (British-born) in Wiesbaden in
Germany.96 Even if they had no formal partner, merchants would often form close alliances
with the foreign-based agents, such as Henry Coit in the United States, who represented the
interests of many of the Cuban-based merchants and planters in North America and Europe,
acting as a go-between with metropolitan merchant bankers such as Moses Taylor of
New York or Baring Brothers of London, through whom they encouraged the consigning
of sugar shipments, and who assisted in ensuring that Cuban products penetrated into
more distant markets.97
87 Roland T. Ely, Cuando reinaba su majestad el azu´car, Havana: Ima´gen Contempora´nea, 2001 [1963],
p. 317.
88 Ibid.
89 MC, MF 235/1/24.
90 Ely, Comerciantes cubanos, pp. 83–140.
91 BA, HC 4.6.1, nos. 4–5.
92 BA, HC 4.6.12, no. 141.
93 BA, HC 4.6.1, no. 1.
94 BA, HC 4.6.8 (part 3), no. 307.
95 BNJM, Lobo 113/1.
96 BA, HC 4.6.12.
97 BNJM, Lobo 113; BA, HC 4.6.8 (part 1), no. 19; BA, HC 4.6.2 (part 2), nos. 216–8.
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Considerable resources came to be expended by Cuban planters in their attempt to main-
tain themselves ahead of the technological game, and such costs continued to increase as the
century progressed and more advances were made. By 1873, the British Consul at Havana
was reporting that ‘The machinery and engines on the Cuban estates are generally of an
expensive and superior character . . . [I]mmense capital is invested solely in the ‘‘manufac-
ture’’; and sugar, far superior in quality to the ‘‘muscavado’’ of Jamaica and Demerara,
is made here on the estates themselves . . . [E]verything has been done, at vast cost, to
supersede or supplement manual labour.’98
Such outlays required finance and, since initially there were no banks operating
directly in the island and no system of government securities, both planters and the Cuban
economy in general quickly became highly dependent upon the foreign-led commercial net-
works and in debt to metropolitan bankers.99 Although the Cuban financial system did
gradually develop through the mid nineteenth century, such that by 1857 there was one
principal bank with deposit and discount facilities and empowered to issue bank notes,
and several other banks in operation,100 these were themselves often underwritten by
foreign bankers.101
Susan Ferna´ndez has shown how ‘encumbered’ the late nineteenth-century Cuban eco-
nomy was by debt and financial dependency, and how strongly the foundations for the
twentieth-century neo-colonial domination of the island by the United States had been
laid during the final decades of Spanish dominion.102 However, her analysis, beginning as
it does following the end of the Ten Years’ War (the first war for Cuban independence) in
1878, falls short of fully comprehending the origins of Cuban economic indebtedness and
dependency – not exclusively to US capital, but to a range of transnational investors – which
can be traced back into the first half of the nineteenth century, and which was closely
related to the development of the Cuban sugar industry and related infrastructure. Metro-
politan bankers were increasingly underpinning most of Cuba’s commerce and economy,
and the door was opened to them by the non-Spanish merchant community (albeit in part-
nership with Spanish-born merchants). In 1832, George Knight proposed that Baring Broth-
ers become his sleeping partners.103 Though he was keen for them to leave him to manage
his own affairs in the island, this enabled the merchant bankers to gain a foothold in Cuba,
which would gradually turn into a stranglehold. When Knight ran into financial difficulties
a few years later, he was forced into bankruptcy by Barings, who readily extended their
credit facilities to Knight’s successor,104 drawing the latter deeper into debt through the
granting of additional credits.105
98 Greenock Sugar Trade Review, 2 April 1873.
99 Ely, Cuando reinaba, p. 300; Susan J. Ferna´ndez, Encumbered Cuba: capital markets and revolt,
1878–1895, Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2002.
100 BA, HC 4.6.8 (part 2), no. 185.
101 BA, HC 4.6.8 (part 3), no. 333.
102 Ferna´ndez, Encumbered Cuba.
103 BA, HC 4.6.2 (part 1), no. 26.
104 BA, HC 4.6.2 (part 2), no. 213a.
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Such credits were soon also being made to Cuban planters. As Roland Ely notes, ‘Credit
was the life blood of the island’s system for the commercialization of sugar. Without
improvements in production and without long-term loans, few planters would have been
in a condition to feed and clothe their workers, buy agricultural implements and necessary
machines, cultivate new land or satisfy their personal pleasures.’106
The same merchants who had initially been the channel bringing external investment
into Cuba came to act as the conduits through which control by the metropolitan bankers
was applied. Mortgages became more and more common, ‘often in the form of loans
secured against the earnings of future crops’.107 Economic crises, or simply a poor crop,
would lead to defaults in payments, as a result of which ownership of Cuban plantations
began to fall into the hands of foreign bankers. Two-thirds of Cuba’s sugar industry had
become mortgaged in this way by the 1860s, with some 95% of estates at least partially
so.108 Their policy was ‘that of a usurer,’ commented the Cuban planter Betancourt
Cisneros, ‘who little by little provides means to a youthful fool until he places him on an
unrepayable debt, and then proceeds to embargo his real estate’.109 Planters, particularly
those of small to middle-sized estates, would thus lose control over their plantations, admin-
istration of which was turned over by the bank to merchant companies resident in Cuba,110
in a manner somewhat similar to that affecting other sectors of the Cuban economy, such as
the railways, most of which had, by the late nineteenth century, ‘lost nearly all of their
national character’, with foreign capital moving from a ‘role of mortgage-holding creditor’
to assume direct control.111
Anton Allahar has argued that, by the mid nineteenth century, merchants in Cuba
had displaced the old Creole landowning class ‘from the pinnacle of Cuban prosperity’.112
However, even the foreign-born merchants who played such an important part in opening
up Cuba to the wider commercial networks had themselves fallen under the control of the
increasingly powerful metropolitan merchant bankers. As with the planters, they were
dependent upon the success of the sugar harvest, and its trade, for their own survival.113
Having started as innovators, they quickly took on the role of debt collectors. This ensured
that not just Cuban trade but increasingly land ownership and production fell under foreign
control. This would be exacerbated after 1868, when the Cuban wars of independence
led to a far greater weakening of the position of the Cuban landowners and a far greater
penetration of foreign capital and ownership.
106 Ely, Cuando reinaba, p. 301.
107 Louis A. Pe´rez Jr, Winds of change: hurricanes and the transformation of nineteenth-century Cuba,
Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001, p. 96.
108 Martı´nez-Ferna´ndez, Torn between empires, p. 106, citing Moreno Fraginals.
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111 Oscar Zanetti and Alejandro Garcı´a, Sugar and railroads: a Cuban history, 1837–1959, Chapel Hill, NC:
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Migrant engineers, privileged scapegoats and
frustrated nationalism
With the migrant engineering workers playing such an important part in the technological
development of Cuba’s sugar industry, it might be expected that their presence would
have been seen to have a positive influence upon the island. However, the increasing debts
that were leading to the island falling inexorably into foreign hands were so firmly con-
nected to the introduction of steam engines and other machinery that the engineers them-
selves came to be seen as symbolizing the new foreign economic domination of Cuba.
Having begun as contributors to the process by which, through new globalizing technolo-
gies, Cuba was gradually shaking off imperial Spanish control, the migrant engineers
became representatives of the flip side of this liberation, through which new forms of imper-
ial subjection were being imposed.
When migrant engineering workers first began to arrive, their presence was seen as bene-
ficial. In 1838, Francisco Diago commented that it ‘suited all of them that there should be
abundant engineering workers in the Island’;114 and Francisco de Paula Serrano declared
in 1839: ‘Small matter that they be foreigners who at present direct the machines; my prin-
ciples are not founded on such absurd nationalism’.115 Such support was not simply because
of their technological contributions but also because, in a culture in which manual labour
was looked down upon by many whites, who felt that it was racially demeaning, the
migrant engineers helped to make it acceptable to get your hands dirty. They were also
exceptionally well paid, and this more than anything demonstrated just how respectable
this was as a career for a young white Cuban. It became a valued prize to secure an appren-
ticeship in a North American foundry. In the late 1850s, it cost between $20 and $30 a
month for a Cuban to be placed with a North American engineering firm,116 and hence
those who sought advancement in this way had either to be from reasonably well-off
families or to have a wealthy sponsor.
Mid nineteenth century sugar mills did not offer an opportunity for the engagement of
free apprentices, since – with the exception of the largest – they generally only required a
single engineer, who would be assisted by slaves trained in the necessary skills under his
guidance.117 There was therefore a shortage of appropriate placements in the island to
meet the growing demand, and the Sociedad Econo´mica (which oversaw many of the eco-
nomic and infrastructural improvements of the period) felt that foreigners opening work-
shops in Cuba should be obliged to take on local apprentices, to teach them their trade.
There was growing resentment that many of them declined so to do.118 Engineering was a
trade with a long tradition of craft exclusiveness, access to which was often closely guarded.
Juan Angel Echerri discovered this on being apprenticed to the machine workshop of the
foreign engineers Keen and Lochkurd in Cienfuegos. During his four years there, his foreign
114 BNJM, Lobo 109/3.
115 Memorias de la Sociedad Econo´mica, 9, 1840, p. 240.
116 BNJM, Lobo 135/2.
117 Curry-Machado, ‘Indispensable aliens’.
118 Memorias de la Sociedad Econo´mica, 1843 (2), pp. 7–9.
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masters paid little attention to his education in the trade, using him and others as little more
than cheap labour. They finally refused to qualify him because he ‘was a blockhead incap-
able of learning’; though it would seem that, in fact, they had simply not bothered to train
him in the necessary skills.119
Such intransigence fed a growing opposition to their presence in Cuba, augmented by
jealousy of the privileges extended to them and paranoia at the possibly detrimental political
and cultural role that they were thought to be playing. These engineers commanded wage
levels far in excess of those of other workers at the time, which generated resentment as
well as helping to mark them as different. For example, in the ‘Angelita’ sugar mill, the for-
eign engineer received $153 a month – a great deal more than the estate’s carpenter and
mason, who only earned $60 and $40 respectively.120 It was not only on the sugar planta-
tions that migrant engineers could expect to be very well paid: the engineer on the Havana
Bay dredger was earning $300 a month, compared to the $95 that the most senior crew
member (other than the captain) was taking home (and the $23 earned by the common
sailors).121 Not only were they paid more, but the engineering workers (in particular those
located on sugar plantations) generally received housing and sustenance free of charge. They
could also on occasion aspire to promotion into positions of greater responsibility, as did
the North American Ezra Dod, who began his time in Cuba working on the construction
of the Havana–Gu¨ines railway before becoming an engineer in the ‘Amistad’ sugar mill.
Here he was eventually named as administrator;122 indeed, other estates also appointed
their migrant engineers as temporary, or on occasions permanent, administrators.123 Some
were able to accumulate sufficient capital to become land owners, establish workshops, or
become merchants themselves – with a potential for upward social mobility unmatched
by others in the plantation economy. This was a source of jealousy among Cuban workers
– and, while one of the first trade unions to be established on the island, in 1850, organized
engineering workers, it overtly excluded non-Spanish migrants from joining.124
The migrant engineers may have been much sought after by the sugar-mill owners, but
their presence was so tied to the machinery (the cost of which was, more than anything
else, leading to the indebtedness of these same planters) that even among the planters they
came to be regarded with distrust. Although it was commonplace for mill owners to make
use of their engineers as agents in their dealings with metropolitan engineering compan-
ies,125 these same engineers often at the same time came to represent the interests of the
engineering companies. This would lead to them occupying a rather contradictory position,
since disputes often occurred between the two parties, as when O. J. Reynolds – engineer for
the Diago family – became employed by the West Point Foundry, while still working for the
119 ANC, GSC 1608/81938.
120 ANC, ML 10789.
121 AHM, UCF 16/1.
122 James H. Dod, ‘Reminiscences of Cuban engineering’, Louisiana Planter and Sugar Manufacturer, 7
February 1914.
123 BL, HEE, MSS Span c.5, ‘La Palma’ Estate Book 4.
124 Joan Casanovas, Bread, or bullets! Urban labor and Spanish colonialism in Cuba, 1850–1898,
Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998, p. 67.
125 BNJM, Lobo 111/1.
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Diagos, and given the task of both extending the Foundry’s sales in Cuba and of ensuring
that the Diagos continued to purchase their machines from them.126
The combination of these elements led them to become ‘privileged scapegoats’,127 their
presence manipulated by the Spanish authorities – themselves highly nervous of the increas-
ing non-Spanish involvement in the Cuban economy, of rival imperial involvement in anti-
slavery and separatist movements, and even (in the case of the United States) of open
attempts to assume control over the island.128 Partly through the scapegoating of these
migrants – symbols though they were, alongside the machines that they operated, of the
modernity that the Creole elite was seeking to bring to the island – the colonial authorities
were able to ‘portray the spread of Cuban nationalism or ideas of slave trade abolition and
emancipation as serving foreign, not local, interests’.129 This contributed to the finger
of suspicion being pointed at several foreign engineers in 1844, accused of complicity in
the revolutionary conspiracies and slave uprisings that subsequently became known as
La Escalera.130 Although the evidence presented against them was highly questionable, a
number were arrested and imprisoned for several months – apparently victims of the repri-
sals against the role played by British abolitionists in stirring up rebellion. The activity of the
British Consul at Havana, David Turnbull, in actively seeking out British subjects who had
been kidnapped into slavery in Cuba – and in acting as an intermediary between the two,
racially segregated, committees attempting to organize an uprising – helped to generate an
atmosphere in which the migrant engineers (most of whom were British or North American)
could readily be placed under suspicion.131 Although they were finally released, the cases
against them having become quite untenable, they had already served the purpose of helping
the Spanish authorities tarnish the conspiracies as foreign-inspired.
By the 1850s, not only had the numbers of privileged migrant engineers working in Cuba
increased but so to too had both the planters’ indebtedness and the control by foreign cap-
ital. At the same time, the Spanish hold over the colony was becoming shakier, with opposi-
tion to them growing among the Cuban population. This created an atmosphere of paranoia
surrounding the migrant engineering workers, which resulted in an official order being sent
out by the island’s governor to his officials in the provinces to keep a careful watch and
account of all such non-Spanish migrant engineers, their absences and movements, with
the clear implication that this group should be especially suspected of subversive involve-
ment.132 Nevertheless, no evidence has been found that any of these engineers were at
all involved politically – beyond the individual expression of views that may have been
126 BNJM, Lobo 109/3.
127 Curry-Machado, ‘Privileged scapegoats’.
128 Martı´nez-Ferna´ndez, Torn between empires.
129 Curry-Machado, ‘Privileged scapegoats’, p. 237.
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national identity in nineteenth-century Latin America, London: ILAS, 2003.
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considered anathema by the colonial authorities. At the same time, the authorities decreed
that all residents (regardless of national origin) should register their trade, and pay a duty
in order to exercise this. Visible by their absence from the long list of occupations stipulated
for such a tariff are the sugar-mill engineers – despite their privileged position and despite
the policy of reporting upon their movements.133 The Spanish authorities might not have
been able to prevent their employment (the sugar industry would have collapsed without
them), but they could certainly ensure that they would continue to be marked as undesir-
able, albeit indispensable, aliens.
Another reaction to the presence of and dependency upon migrant engineers was the
attempt to establish specialist schools in the island to train indigenous engineering workers.
By so doing, it was hoped to end the skills shortage that had made the immigration neces-
sary in the first place. The establishment of such a school was first suggested in the late
1830s, shortly after the extensive immigration of engineering workers had begun. It was
an increasing concern for the authorities in Havana that, as more and more steam engines,
mills and other high-tech equipment poured into the country’s plantations, the country was
finding itself dependent not only upon foreign capital but also upon the physical presence in
the island of many non-Spanish skilled workers. They were not so concerned about the car-
penters, masons, or even boilermakers who arrived; from the start, they were disproportio-
nately preoccupied with the migrant engineers. As Cubans travelled abroad to learn the
necessary skills, and returned to the island, there were attempts locally to pass such know-
ledge on to their countrymen. In 1845, the following proposal to establish a school in
Matanzas was advertised in the press:
The desire to have schools of mechanics, as applied to the steam engines of the sugar
mills and railways, is about to be satisfied. A native of Matanzas, educated abroad,
where he has been a director of large establishments, and has constructed railroads,
wishes to give to his homeland the precious gift of educating its sons and so free
them from a foreign contribution.134
It was in Havana that most effort was made to establish an engineering school, and this
was promoted by the Sociedad Econo´mica as a part of its general campaign to improve urban,
working-class education. The Escuela de Maquinaria (School of Machinery) was founded in
1845,135 with fifty students matriculating in its first year – more not being possible, since
the building with which they were provided lacked the space. By the end of this first year
they were claiming success, with many landowners (for whom the students had worked dur-
ing the year) contracting the students again for the coming grinding season: ‘because they
have not been able to avoid feeling heated by that holy patriotic fire that is always to be found
in the breasts of the Spanish, when they so visibly perceive happy results’. 136
133 ANC, Miscela´nea de Expedientes, 75/Ai, Orden del Capitan General, 8 December 1851, La Aurora de
Matanzas, 3 January 1852. The exclusion of foreign sugar-mill engineers from the matriculation of trades
appears to have been maintained at least until the outbreak of the first war of Cuban independence in
1868.
134 El Faro Industrial de la Habana, 10 April 1845.
135 Memorias de la Sociedad Econo´mica, 36, 1848 (1), pp. 31–4.
136 Memorias de la Sociedad Econo´mica, 33, 1846 (2), p. 359.
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This might have seemed encouraging by those who were patriotically minded, and cer-
tainly it was important as a first step towards the indigenous development of industrial skills
in Cuba. However, the School made very little real impression on the country’s need for for-
eign workers. The latter were quite scathing of the efforts of the School: ‘One very grave
[obstacle] has been that the opinion of the foreign engineers has constantly been opposed
to [the School], and without knowing nor even visiting it, they have declared the impossib-
ility that good operatives could be produced by an establishment that does not belong to
them, and which is not in France or England but in Havana.’137 They may have had a point.
Since the numbers graduating from the School were hardly a threat to the job prospects of
the migrant engineers, given the ever-increasing demand for such workers and the general
shortage of them, it is unlikely that such criticism was motivated by selfish reasons. It seems
that the sponsors and organizers of the School underestimated the degree of training needed
to be able to take personal charge of the equipment of a sugar mill, dealing with all eventu-
alities. In mid-nineteenth-century Britain and the United States, engineers generally began
their education in the trade in early adolescence. Having served an apprenticeship lasting
several years, they qualified to become journeymen. Their training did not stop there: if
they aspired to become masters, they not only had to work their way up the workshop hier-
archy but also had to obtain specialist technical education. Even though many of them may
have travelled to Cuba in the hope of short-circuiting the craft exclusiveness that may have
prevented them from advancement in their home countries, the average age on arrival of
such engineers was thirty-one.138 Supposing they had begun in the trade around the age
of fourteen, they therefore already had an average of seventeen years’ experience before
being employed in Cuba.
This was something that does not seem to have been fully appreciated. Many of the
Cubans who studied in the School of Machinery, and their families, seem to have believed
that ‘they could be, and that they are, complete engineers in a year’.139 Often driven by
the prospect of the high earnings that they dreamed of obtaining (and that they saw foreign-
ers claiming), this failure to understand the slow, incremental path of formation needed, not
just by aspiring engineers but by the country as a whole in its attempt to develop the skills
needed by its economy, led to a high dropout rate from the School. Not surprisingly, this
provoked considerable scepticism on the part of the migrant engineers. However, by seeking
to protect the standards of their craft, which they saw being undercut by the School, while
at the same time generally showing little interest in playing a positive role in the develop-
ment of native engineers, they exacerbated the feelings of hostility shown towards them
and fuelled the impulse that led to the establishment of the School in the first place.
At the time of the heightened official paranoia about the presence in Cuba of so many
migrant engineers, in the early 1850s, the Junta de Fomento assumed control over the
School, ‘so that it may succeed in the important and primordial objective of satisfying our
local necessities without the help of foreign hands’.140 Jose´ Gutie´rrez de la Concha, the
137 Memorias de la Sociedad Econo´mica, 36, 1848 (1), pp. 31–4.
138 ANC, ML 11080, 11397, and 11910.
139 Memorias de la Sociedad Econo´mica, 36, 1848 (1), pp. 31–4.
140 AHN, UCF 30/2, No.32.
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Captain General and Governor of Cuba, considered this to be important more as a patriotic
undertaking than one of economic necessity. The original motivation for the school
had been to train the brightest of the urban working class. Under the new, Spanish-state-
sponsored management, priority was given to ‘the orphans of military families and servants
of the State, and particularly those who lost their lives and fortunes in the defence of Spain
in our old American possessions’. The intention was that these would form a bulwark
against foreign engineers, ‘who, spread about our sugar mills and on the railroads, are a
seed for propaganda in the ideas of secession, and who are internal enemies that it is essen-
tial that we free ourselves from’.141 The new directors of the School sought to make it a
‘large industrial enterprise’, so moving away from the original conception of it assisting in
the gradual foundation and improvement of the skills upon which the island’s economy
could subsequently be developed. Previously, the School had provided subsidized training
for young Cuban engineers who could then obtain employment in the mills and railways,
providing them with the theoretical knowledge that they would later put into practice.
But now they purchased expensive machinery from abroad, with the students becoming
apprentices, attempting to learn the advanced applications of steam technology through
construction. By so doing, the state hoped that it might acquire a workshop of which it
could be proud, rivalling the great foundries of the metropolitan powers. But this attempt
to turn an institution that had begun with the simple aim of enabling some native engineers
to replace some of the foreigners into one that attempted both to train highly skilled techni-
cians and to produce its own machines – virtually overnight, in conditions lacking the neces-
sary pre-existing industrial infrastructure and skills base – was a disaster. As soon as the
state realized this, they quickly returned it to its original management, slashing its budget
in the process and virtually guaranteeing its failure.142
Although the aim had been to free Cuban planters and rail companies from the need to
contract foreign engineers, the School may actually have accentuated this reliance on outsi-
ders. By the 1850s there were, to be sure, a small but steadily growing number of suitably
skilled Cubans and Spanish. However, they continued to be too few to meet the growing
demand for engineers that resulted from the generalization and extension in the use of steam
engines and mills, as the sugar frontier pushed eastwards. The failure of the school experi-
ment inspired little confidence in the majority of planters, driven as they were more by eco-
nomic than patriotic concerns; and they were more likely to show prejudice in favour of
employing ‘superior’ foreign technicians to operate and maintain the foreign-built engines
and mills that had cost them so much and towards which they felt such pride. Native engi-
neers might have been cheaper, but both engineer and engine were seen almost as status
symbols by those planters who could afford them, and an indication of their estate’s mod-
ernity and the superiority of its product.143
But the island’s reliance on non-Spanish migrant engineers continued to rankle. In 1857,
the Compan˜ı´a Espan˜ola de Fundicio´n y Meca´nica (Spanish Foundry and Machine Com-
pany) was formed. Its founder argued that ‘The establishment of this Society is evidently
141 AHN, Estado 8044/7.
142 Memorias de la Sociedad Econo´mica, 46b, 1855–9.
143 Curry-Machado, ‘Privileged scapegoats’.
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useful and even necessary because in the material of Foundry and Mechanics we depend on
foreigners imposing the law.’144 The following year, Manuel Herna´ndez Aranda invented a
sugar train, which he advertised as being specifically ‘Cuban’. His application for a patent
and privilege for his invention reads more like a nationalist treatise, than a blueprint for a
contribution to technology: ‘Our emerging agriculture demands a great help so as to remove
it from that rachitic state in which it finds itself, and to elevate it to its peak, given that,
without the necessity of begging from foreigners, there exists in our country extraordinary
elements with which to achieve this.’145 Even though his invention seems to have been little
more than an adaptation of the Jamaica trains widely used for the evaporation process of
sugar production, Herna´ndez Aranda showed the same excess of patriotic optimism that
had doomed the School of Machinery to ineffectuality, believing it possible for Cuba not
only to be on the same technological level as the industrial countries but even to rival and
surpass them; all that was needed was the desire to do so.
Conclusion
Herna´ndez Aranda and his Cuban sugar train are symbolic of the shift that had occurred
during the nineteenth century. The same spirit for advancement that the early promoters
of new technology in Cuba had shown, and which had represented a break with the Spanish
imperial past and self-confident hopes for a more independent future, was also demon-
strated by Herna´ndez Aranda, only this time as something of a forlorn hope against the,
by then, irrepressible forces of technological advancement that were being led and con-
trolled by foreign powers, exerting ever-increasing control over the Cuban economy and
production. The introduction of steam engines and related machinery, along with the skilled
workers required to operate them, was not simply an example of this process but was cent-
ral to it, along with the commercial networks with which they were so associated. Although
this would be accentuated later in the century, through a combination of the devastating
impact of the wars of independence and the ever more costly and complex steam and
sugar-making machinery, the process was already well advanced by the 1850s.
David Jeremy has identified four stages of technological transfer: new technology intro-
duced through migrants or the diffusion of plans and prototypes; establishment of pilot
installations; modification of designs as a result of local conditions; and reverse transfer,
back to where the technology had originated.146 However, in the Cuban case, local prota-
gonists were of fundamental importance in the initiation of the transfer process. Rather
than it coming from the seeds sown by migrants (whether engineers or entrepreneurs), it
was the Cuban planters themselves who went out into the world in search of solutions for
what they perceived as being the necessities of their industry. Once they had brought back
and introduced examples of new technology and scientific-industrial thinking, it would cer-
tainly seem that Jeremy’s stages occurred, but his model is perhaps too linear. It might be
more appropriate to think of the stages as ongoing, coexisting elements, once the initial
144 ANC, GSC 1594/81606.
145 ANC, RCJF 207/9310.
146 Jeremy, Transatlantic industrial revolution.
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impulse had been given. In effect, a network of technological transfer and development
became established, involving the introduction and spread of new advances not just from
the metropolitan industrial centres but also from the sugar mills. This network linked a
number of agents, from Creole planters to the engineering companies, through commercial
agents, metropolitan banks, diasporic merchants, and migrant engineers. The relationship
between these different groups resulted in a network that was dynamic, responsive to
advances (wherever they occurred), and that had a gathering momentum that resulted in
its ongoing extension, and with this the spread of the new technology to ever more planta-
tions and mills. However, the need for external investment led to a financial situation in
which local upsets – whether economically or politically inspired – resulted in those who
controlled this capital (generally based in the metropolitan centres) gaining in influence
and power over the local actors who had instigated the process.
Both the spread of steam technology in the nineteenth century and the related international
trade networks are examples of how the processes of globalization that are seen to character-
ize our current period of late capitalism were historically founded. This has long been recog-
nized – as seen in Immanuel Wallerstein’s concept of the centrality of world systems
in understanding the interconnected development of the planet’s economy and society –
as a necessity for tracing the history of the emergence of the global capitalist system, presided
over by European hegemonic powers.147 Similarly, Eric Hobsbawm has shown how the inter-
dependence of every part of this world system reveals how individual nations come to emerge
not just as historically contingent but within the constraints imposed by wider, transnational
forces.148 More recently, the ‘global history’ approach has developed on such perspectives,
seeking ‘to transcend the nation-state as the focus of history’.149
I would argue that this mid-nineteenth-century Cuban case demonstrates how the net-
works of capital, trade, skills, and technology through which key commodities, such as
sugar, moved – along with the related human movement and settlement – were not directly
tied to competing empires, related though they may have been to these. Rather, they were
transnational, transimperial, even globalized in scope. What is also shown is that such net-
works were not simply imposed upon Cuba by imperial interests. As Robert Marks has writ-
ten, ‘however influential Europeans may have been in the making of this modern world,
they did not make it themselves’,150 and much of the impetus for development in Cuba
came from actors in the island itself and from the transnational relationships that they them-
selves established. Thus, although the machines that were increasingly revolutionizing pro-
duction worldwide were mainly built in the core industrializing countries, the technological
developments were the result of the interconnection between manufacturers and their
147 Immanuel Wallerstein, The capitalist world economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979;
and The modern world system, 3 vols., New York: Academic Press, 1974–89. Also Terence K. Hopkins
and Immanuel Wallerstein, World systems analysis, theory and methodology, Beverley Hills, CA: Sage,
1982.
148 Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and nationalism since 1780: programme, myth, reality, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990.
149 Bruce Mazlish, ‘An introduction to global history’, in Bruce Mazlish and Ralph Buultjens, eds.,
Conceptualizing global history, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993, pp. 1–24.
150 Robert B. Marks, The origins of the modern world: a global and ecological narrative, Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2002, p. 155.
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clients, such as Cuba’s sugar planters. This would seem to confirm what Patrick O’Brien has
shown: that ‘for the Third World, the history of enforced (and/or unavoidable) dependence
on ‘‘European middlemen’’ did not necessarily signify exploitation’.151 The actors through
which this was made possible were, alongside the Creole planters, the skilled migrant work-
ers who, like Charles Edmonstone, were using their presence in the field to stimulate further
developments, so as to better meet the needs of local production. As David Jeremy has
argued, migrant engineering workers were ‘by far the most important vehicle of technology
transfer’: ‘they were able to interact with the technological system on the one hand, with the
natural and cultural environment of the receptor society on the other hand, and so make the
multitude of adjustments that were necessary in accommodating a new technological system
to fresh, cross-cultural surroundings.’152
What this Cuban case shows is that the globalizing tendencies that were in motion were
not initially brought about by the imperial designs of powerful nations, intent upon extend-
ing their global influence. At the outset, the impulse came from beneath the shadow of con-
flicting empires, inspired by the needs and aspirations of local actors, with the collaboration
of migrant artisans and merchants who facilitated Cuba’s entry into the transnational
networks that were extending themselves globally during the nineteenth century. It is for
this reason that I have characterized this as ‘sub-imperial’ globalization, and those involved –
the Cuban sugar planters, and the migrant merchants and engineers – as being the
‘sub-imperial’ agents through whom this came about.
However, as Cuba’s history shows, for all that it may be necessary to look beyond the
political boundaries imposed by empires – so as to see the much more complex social inter-
actions that lay beneath – this is not to deny the dominant role played by imperialism. The
sub-imperial globalizing tendencies described here were instrumental in weakening the
Spanish empire’s hold over Cuba. Yet, with terrible ironic inevitability, out of the flames
that consumed one empire, stepped – phoenix-like – the figure of empire reborn. The tech-
nological advances that so inspired the Cuban planters brought new forms of subjugation,
which would lead, at the end of the nineteenth century, to freedom from Spain being
replaced by domination by the United States; and the migrant engineers and merchants,
for all their own sub-imperial identity and apparent freedom from imperial prejudice and
concern, proved to be the agents through which this new imperial control came to be
imposed. Thus, the compelling figure of Charles Edmonstone riding through all weathers
to spread new machinery to Cuba’s sugar plantations hides the story of how engineering
advances, spreading independently of imperial projects, could at the same time be the cause
both of the weakening of old imperialisms and the emergence of new ones.
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